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PERFORMANCE OF THE SYSTEM IV:
IMPLEMENTATION

Revenge of the Push-Me, Pull-You:
The Implementation Process Under the
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding
TIMOTHY

M.

REIF* AND MARJORIE FLORESTAL**

I. Synopsis
The 1967 film Doctor Dolittle' featured a genetically-peculiar llama with a
head on each end, aptly named a Push-Me, Pull-You. The concept of the animal
was that if one person pulled it on one end while another pushed on the far end,
the beast would move along in the desired direction. If, on the other hand, persons
on each end simultaneously pushed or simultaneously pulled, the animal would
not go anywhere and would very likely spit, as llamas are wont to do, on both
individuals involved.
The implementation process under the Dispute Settlement Understanding
*Timothy Reif is International Trade Counsel with Dewey Ballantine LLP and Adjunct Professor
of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, where he teaches in the area of WTO and NAFTA
dispute resolution. Prior to his current positions, Mr. Reif served as Trade Counsel to the Committee
on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1993 to 1995, and Associate General
Counsel in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative from 1989 to 1993.
**This article was written while Ms. Florestal was an attorney with Dewey Ballantine LLP. Ms.
Florestal is also an LLM candidate at the Georgetown University Law Center. She is currently
Assistant General Counsel, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.
The views of the authors are their own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative or the U.S. Government. The authors extend their appreciation to
Alyson Petroni, a summer associate with the firm in 1997, and legal assistants Megan Reif and Helen
Whiteley for their assistance in completing this project.
1. The film, which starred Rex Harrison, Samantha Eggar, and Anthony Newley, and received nine Academy Award nominations, including Best Picture, Best Original Musical Score,
and Best Song ("Talk to the Animals," which won), was based on Hugh Lofting's stories from
the 1920s.
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(DSU)2 of the World Trade Organization (WTO) bears a strong resemblance in its
operation (without the spitting) to the Push-Me, Pull-You. Increasingly, winning
complainants and losing defendants are simultaneously pulling or pushing on the
precise wording of a panel and/or Appellate Body report in an attempt to define
precisely the nature and extent of a losing defendant's obligation.
In this regard, we conclude that the implementation provisions in articles 21
and 22 of the DSU face two principal challenges: speed and thoroughness of
implementation by losing parties. With regard to speed of implementation, the
process appears to be working relatively smoothly, albeit with more reliance on
the fifteen-month guidepost at article 21.4 than might be optimal.
By contrast, with regard to thoroughness, the process faces substantial challenges in the ongoing implementation of three key decisions: Canada-Periodicals, EU-Bananasand EU-Beef Hormones. In each of these cases, the losing
party has-to the consternation of the winning parties-issued a combination of
vague commitments to implement and statements of intent to replace the measures
found to be GATT-inconsistent with other measures of comparable protective
value. In each of these cases, substantial differences exist between the views of
the complaining and defending Members with respect to the defending Member's
implementation obligations. These differences are already raising significant challenges for the DSU implementation process. Such challenges are likely to continue
to arise, particularly in politically-important cases and/or ones involving complicated issues of fact and/or law.
We recommend that one key way for the system to manage implementation
of such decisions more effectively is through early use of the ninety-day panel
review process provided for at article 21.5 (for example, starting three to six
months after adoption of the panel or Appellate Body report). However, while
article 21.5 provides a useful mechanism, it is unlikely in itself to provide a
solution to shortcomings that are becoming apparent in the DSU's implementation
provisions. These shortcomings reflect the fundamentally political nature of the
implementation process-in contrast to the earlier stages of the dispute resolution
process under the DSU, which are at least somewhat more insulated from political
pressures. At the same time, the types of cases that appear to be presenting the
greatest challenges for the implementation processes under the DSU are the same
types of cases that are challenging the ability of the system at other stages: namely,
cases that are factually and/or legally more complicated than the typical GATT
complaint, as well as more politically-prominent cases.
In Section II, below, we summarize the DSU's provisions on implementation.
In Section III, we evaluate how the DSU provisions have been used or applied
2. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VOL. 1 (1994), 33

I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
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in each of the eight cases for which the implementation process has, at a minimum,
begun. In Section IV, we offer some preliminary conclusions.
II. Summary of DSU Implementation and Compensation/
Suspension Provisions
A.

IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS UNDER ARTICLES

21

AND

22

Article 21 of the DSU is entitled "Surveillance of Implementation of Recommendations and Rulings" and sets out the WTO's process for the implementation of panel and Appellate Body decisions. If a losing party does not fully
implement a decision, article 22 provides for "Compensation and the Suspension of Concessions."
The first paragraph of article 21 contains an admonition to all WTO Members
to comply promptly with recommendations or rulings of the Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB). B Article 21 also contains three paragraphs devoted to disputes
involving developing country Members: (1) article 21.2 provides that "[p]articular attention should be paid to matters affecting the interests of developing
country Members with respect to measures which have been subject to dispute
settlement;" (2) article 21.7 similarly directs the DSB to consider, in cases
brought by developing country Members, "what further action it might take
which would be appropriate to the circumstances;" and (3) article 21.8 further
directs the DSB, in cases brought by developing country Members, to "take
into account not only the trade coverage of measures complained of, but also
their impact on the economy of developing country Members concerned."
These provisions have not been applied to date, and it is unclear what, if any,
precise impact they will have on implementation of decisions in cases involving
developing country Members.
B.

THREE-PHASE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS UNDER THE

DSU

Article 21, paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6, contains the key operational directions
concerning implementation of panel and Appellate Body decisions. Under the
procedures established at article 21, there are essentially three phases to implementation of a panel or Appellate Body decision.
1. Phase 1: Acceptance of Plan for Implementation
If a panel or Appellate Body report finds that a WTO Member has acted in
a manner that is inconsistent with its WTO obligations, or nullifies or impairs
benefits within the meaning of article XXIII: l(b) of the GATT 1994, 4 article
3. Article 21.1 provides that "[p]rompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the
DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members."
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
FALL 1998
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21.3 requires that the Member notify the DSB of its plan for implementing the
report at a DSB meeting held within thirty days after the report is adopted.'
Article 21.3 further provides that "[if it is impracticableto comply immediately
with the recommendations and rulings, the Member
concerned shall have a rea6
so."
do
to
which
in
time
of
period
sonable
Article 21.3 provides three alternative methods for determining a "reasonable
period of time." The first option, set out at article 21.3(a), is "the period of
time proposed by the Member concerned provided that such period is approved
by the DSB." 7 In other words, the time period must be acceptable to the winning
complainant and all the other members of the DSB. Second, "in the absence of
such approval, '" 8 article 21.3(b) provides that a "reasonable period of time" is
"a period of time agreed by the parties to the dispute within forty-five days
after the date of adoption of the [report]." 9 Finally, "in the absence of such
agreement,"' 0 article 21.3(c) provides that "a reasonable period of time" will
be "[d]etermined through binding arbitrationwithin ninety days after the date
of adoption of the [report]."" Article 21.3(c) further provides that:
[a] guideline for the arbitrator should be that the reasonable period of time ... should
not exceed fifteen months from the date of adoption of a panel or Appellate Body
report. However, that time may be shorter or longer, depending upon the particular
circumstances. 12
It is notable that except in non-violation cases, 3 the mandate of the arbitrator
is limited to determining the period of time for implementation. In non-violation
cases, article 26.1(c) provides that an arbitrator under article 21.3(c) may,
"[u]pon the request of either party, . . . include a determination of the level of
benefits which have been nullified or impaired, and may also suggest ways and
"
means of reaching a mutually satisfactory adjustment ...
Article 26. 1(c) also stipulates that "such suggestions shall not be binding upon
the parties to the dispute."
2. Phase 2: Monitoring Implementation
During the fifteen-month implementation period, the DSU provides the winning
complainant two principal mechanisms to compel a losing Member's compliance
5. Footnote 11 to article 21.3 provides that if no meeting of the DSB has been "scheduled
during this period, such a meeting of the DSB shall be held for this purpose."
6. GATT, supra note 4, art. 21.3 (emphasis added).
7. Id. art. 21.3(a) (emphasis added).
8. DSU, supra note 2, art. 21.3(a).
9. GATT, supra note 4, art. 21.3(b) (emphasis added).
10. DSU, supra note 2, art. 21.3(b).
11. GATT, supra note 4, art. 21.3(c) (emphasis added).
12. Id. (footnote omitted). Footnote 13 to article 21.3(c) provides that "Itihe expression 'arbitrator' shall be interpreted as referring either to an individual or a group."
13. "Non-violation cases" refer to those brought under article XXIII: 1(b), in which the complaining party alleges that a measure applied by the defending party, while not in violation of a provision
of GATT, nonetheless nullifies or impairs benefits owed to the complaining party, or impedes the
attainment of an objective of the GATT.
VOL. 32, NO. 3
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with a panel decision. Complainants can request review by the original panel or
active monitoring of the losing country's implementation of the decision. As we
discuss below at section C, countries have, in fact, used these mechanisms in
the context of the nine disputes in which losing defendants were required to
implement panel decisions.
a. Dispute settlement
Under article 21.5, a winning complainant can, at any point following the
adoption of a panel or Appellate Body decision, request a ninety-day review by
a panel (the DSU specifies that the original panel should conduct the review
"wherever possible") 4 where it disagrees with the losing party '[a]s to the
existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply
with the recommendations and rulings. . . ." In other words, if the losing party
at any point during the implementation process takes an action that it claims is
in compliance with any element of the panel or Appellate Body decision, and
the winning complainant disagrees, the complainant can request that the panel
be reconstituted to decide the issue.
b. DSB surveillance
Article 21.6 of the DSU further provides that "[t]he DSB shall keep under
surveillance the implementation of adopted recommendations or rulings." This
provision ensures ongoing oversight by the DSB over panel and Appellate Body
decisions that are being implemented.
If passive oversight by the DSB is not perceived as adequate by a winning
complainant, article 21.6 provides express authority for any WTO Member,
including the winning party, to raise "[t]he issue of implementation of the recommendations or rulings at any time following their adoption." Further, paragraph
6 provides that "[u]nless the DSB decides otherwise, the issue of implementation
shall be placed on the agenda of the DSB meeting after six months following
the date of establishment of the reasonable period of time . . . and shall remain
on the DSB's agenda until the issue is resolved." In this context, the losing
defendant is required to submit "[a] status report in writing of its progress in
the implementation of the recommendations or rulings" ten days before each
such meeting of the DSB.
3. Phase 3: Retaliation/Compensation
a. Summary
Article 22.2 provides that if the losing party does not implement the panel's
recommendations or rulings within a reasonable period of time, the winning
complainant may seek compensation. If the winning party requests such compensation, the losing party is required to enter into consultations "with a view to
14. DSU, supra note 2, art. 21.5.
FALL 1998
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developing mutually acceptable compensation." If no acceptable compensation
has been agreed within twenty days after the expiration of the reasonable period
of time, the complainant or, in fact, "[any party having invoked the dispute
settlement procedures, may request authorization from the DSB to suspend the
application to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations under
the covered agreements. "5
Article 22.6 provides that within thirty days of the end of the "reasonable
period," the DSB is required to authorize suspension of concessions or other
obligations if the parties have not agreed to compensation. There are only two
exceptions to this mandatory DSB-authorized suspension of concessions or obligations. First, the DSB may decide by consensus to reject the request (unlikely,
of course, since the consensus would have to include the party requesting suspension). The second exception occurs when the defending country objects to the
level of suspension proposed or asserts that the "principles and procedures"
established at article 22.3 have not been followed in determining the level of
suspension. In such a case, the authorization for suspension may be delayed while
the matter is referred to arbitration. Article 22.6 provides that the arbitration is
to be conducted by the original panel, "if members are available," or by an
arbitrator appointed by the Director-General, and must be completed within sixty
days of the expiration of the reasonable period. Article 22.6 further directs that
the complaining party not suspend concessions or other obligations while the
arbitration is being conducted.
b. Legal Status of Compensation and Suspension
A central-if not the central-question on the subject of the implementation
of panel decisions is the legal status under the DSU and the WTO agreements
of the three possible ways in which a WTO Member can respond to losing a panel
or Appellate Body decision: losing Members can respond by (1) implementing the
recommendations and rulings fully; (2) providing compensation; or (3) accepting
suspension of concessions by the winning party(ies). This issue is addressed most
directly by article 22.1, which provides:
[c]ompensation and the suspension of concessions or other obligations are temporary
measures available in the event that the recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a reasonable period of time. However, neither compensation nor the
suspension of concessions or other obligations is preferred to full implementation of
a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered agreements.
Compensation is voluntary and, if granted, shall be consistent with the covered
agreements.
Article 22.1 makes two less-than-completely-clear statements. The first sentence provides that compensation and the suspension of concessions are "temporary measures" to be used if the losing defendant does not implement the panel

15. Id. art. 22.2 (emphasis added).
VOL. 32, NO. 3
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or Appellate Body's recommendations within a reasonable period of time. The
implication (unstated in the text) is that implementation should, in fact, occur at
some point. However, the term "temporary" is not defined, thus leaving open
the possibility that it could be a considerable period of time.
The second sentence of article 22.1 provides that neither compensation nor
suspension is to be preferred to full implementation. The wording of this sentence
does not state that the first option-full implementation-is to be preferred, just
that the other two options-compensation or suspension-are not to be preferred.
In the United States, the Statement of Administrative Action (SAA) to the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) offers the following comments on
article 22.1: "Article 22 makes clear that compensation is intended to be temporary and thatfull implementation of a panel or Appellate Body recommendation
is the preferredresult." 6 However, the section of the SAA that deals with "administrative action" to implement the DSU emphasizes the ability of Congress
to decide whether any change to U.S. law will be made in response to a panel
decision: "[i]f a report recommends that the United States change federal law
to bring it into conformity with a Uruguay Round agreement, it is for the Congress
to decide whether any such change will be made."' 7
Further, the SAA appears to suggest that all three implementation options are
possible and that none is preferred:
The DSU recognizes that it may not be possible for a government to agree to the
removal of a measure that a panel has found to be inconsistent with a Uruguay Round
agreement. Accordingly, it provides for alternative resolutions, including the provision
of trade compensation and other negotiated settlements, or the suspension of benefits
equivalent to the "nullification or impairment" of benefits caused by the offending
measure.

18

This view is bolstered by the testimony of Administration officials, who
addressed a variety of questions from Members of Congress concerning the impact
on U.S. "sovereignty" of the operation of the DSU. In this context, senior
Administration officials repeatedly stated that the United States would not be
obligated to change any U.S. laws found to be inconsistent with a WTO
agreement, 9
16. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement Of Administrative Action. H.R. Doc. No. 103316, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. 1016 (1994) (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 1032.
18. Id.

19. U.S. Government officials have made a number of remarks concerning the WTO's dispute
settlement mechanism:
"[N]o ruling by any dispute panel, under this new dispute settlement mechanism ... can force
us to change any federal, state or local law or regulation. Not the city council of Los Angeles, nor
the Senate of the United States can be bound by these dispute settlement rulings ..
" GATT
Implementation: Hearing Before the Senate Comm, on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 104th

Cong. (1994) (statement of Amb. Mickey Kantor, United States Trade Representative).
"[A] WTO dispute settlement panel recommendation does not automatically change U.S. law. It
has no self-executing effect in the U.S. constitutional system. Only Congress can change that law
FALL 1998
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Similarly, commentators have also focused on this provision of the DSU and
offered their interpretations of its meaning. For example, Judith Hippler Bello
has commented that "[1like the GATT rules that preceded them, the WTO rules
are simply not 'binding' in the traditional sense." 20 Bello continued:
When a panel established under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding issues a
ruling adverse to a member, there is no prospect of incarceration, injunctive relief,
damages for harm inflicted or police enforcement. The WTO has no jailhouse, no bail
bondsmen, no blue helmets, no truncheons or tear gas.
Rather, the WTO-essentially a confederation of sovereign national governmentsrelies upon voluntary compliance. The genius of the GATT/WTO system is the flexibility
with which it accommodates the national exercise of sovereignty, yet promotes compliance with its trade rules through incentives. 2'
In response, John Jackson examined eleven clauses in the DSU (articles 3:4,
3:5, 3:7, 11, 19:1, 21:1,21:6, 22:1,22:2, 22:8, 26: l(b)) and came to a different
conclusion:
I would suggest that the overall gist of those clauses, in the light of the practice

of GATT, and perhaps supplemented by the preparatory work of the negotiators
(unfortunately not well documented), strongly suggests that the legal effect of an
adopted panel report is the
22 international law obligation to perform the recommendation of the panel report.

The World Trade Organization: Hearing Before the
to implement a panel recommendation ....
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 104th Cong. (1994) (statement of Rufus Yerxa, Deputy United
States Trade Representative).
"[T]he United States maintains the right to decide whether and how to implement dispute
settlement decisions, and the U.S. Congress retains its full powers under our Constitution to
change or not to change U.S. laws." The World Trade Organization:Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 104th Cong. (1994) (statement of Amb. Mickey Kantor, United
States Trade Representative).
"[T]he agreement does not infringe on U.S. sovereignty ... WTO panel decisions will not have
binding force as a matter of U.S. law. Congress must enact any changes in U.S. law that are going
to occur." The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness of the House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 104th Cong. (1994) (statement of Amb. Mickey Kantor, United States
Trade Representative).
However, then we have a choice. We're not
"We could be the subject of an adverse ruling.
forced to change any law as a result. That's up to the Congress of the United States. We've given
up no sovereignty." GA TT UruguayRound Agreements: HearingBefore the House Comm. onAgriculture, 104th Cong. (1994) (statement of Amb. Mickey Kantor, United States Trade Representative).
"Nothing in the dispute settlement mechanism ... requires the United States to change or alter
its laws or pass new laws or to repeal old laws. Of course if ... we're the subject of a negative
finding of the panel, we might have to pay either compensation or be the subject of some trade
action. That would be a choice we would make. We retain full sovereignty to make those choices
on our own." US. Trade Policy: HearingBefore the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 104th Cong.
(1994) (statement of Amb. Mickey Kantor, United States Trade Representative).
20. Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less Is More, 90 AM.
J. INT'L L. 416-17 (1996).
21. Id. at 417.
22. John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstandingson the
Nature of the Legal Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 60, 62-63 (1997) (footnote omitted).
VOL. 32, NO. 3
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However, Professor Jackson observed that "[t]he language of the DSU does not
solidly 'nail down' this issue." 2 3 While noting that other international treaties
such as article 94 of the United Nations Charter and article 59 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice provide a clearer statement of the obligation,
Professor Jackson concedes that the DSU does not contain similar language:
"[s]ome sort of comparable language for the WTO Agreement and/or the DSU
would have been welcome.
. . .But one does not find language of the UN-ICJ
2' 4
type in the DSU.
It is difficult to overstate the importance of this issue to the sound functioning
and development of the WTO's dispute resolution process. The question of the
specific nature of a WTO Member's legal obligation with respect to an adverse
finding in a dispute settlement report goes to the core of the nature of membership
in the WTO. With all due deference to Professor Jackson, who makes a number
of good and key points in his article, an understanding of this central issue cannot
be based on what the overall "gist" of a series of provisions "suggests." Such
an obligation must be explicit, affirmatively agreed to and clearly understood
by all Members. Imposing such an obligation based on anything less than an
explicit provision would create a substantial risk that members would conclude
that the dispute settlement system requires of them obligations and actions to
which they did not agree. Certainly, that would be the case in the United States.
By Professor Jackson's own admission, the DSU does not meet this strict-but,
in our view, necessary-test.
C.

STEP BY STEP DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLE 22 PROCESS

If a losing Member has not implemented the panel or Appellate Body decision
within the "reasonable period of time," the DSU establishes five essential steps
in the compensation/retaliation process provided for at article 22.
1. Step 1: Enter into negotiationson compensation
The first step under article 22.2 is that the losing Member shall, if requested
by "any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures," enter into
negotiations no later than expiry of the reasonable period "with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation."
2. Step 2: Request suspension of concessions
Article 22.2 further provides that if mutually satisfactory compensation is not
agreed upon within twenty days after the expiration of the reasonable period,
any winning party may then request authorization from the DSB to suspend
application of concessions or other obligations.

23. Id. at 62.
24. Id.

FALL 1998
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3. Step 3: Follow DSU guidance on suspension
Article 22.3 of the DSU further provides a set of "principles and procedures"
that are to be followed by a complaining party in considering what concessions
or other obligations to suspend. These "principles and procedures" may be
summarized as follows.
The party "should first seek to suspend concessions or other obligations with
respect to the same sector(s) as that in which the panel or Appellate Body decision
has found a violation or other nullification or impairment." 2 5 If the party "[c]onsiders that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other obligations" 26 in the same sector, it "may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations in other sectors under the same agreement."2" If the party considers that
this is not practicable or effective either, "[i]t may seek to suspend concessions
or other obligations under another covered agreement."28 In other words, article
22 of the DSU establishes a three-tier hierarchy for suspension of concessions
that may be summarized as: first option is the same sector; second option is
different sector, same agreement; third option is different agreement. The DSU
provides a precise definition of the terms "sector" and "agreement" as those
terms are used in article 22.3.29 In summary form, "sector" means: in the case
of goods, all goods; in the case of services, one of the eleven "principal sectors"
set out in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS);30 and, in the case
of trade-related intellectual property rights, one of the seven types of intellectual
property rights provided for in part II (copyright, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, layout-designs of integrated circuits, or protection of undisclosed information) or the obligations under parts III or IV of
the TRIPS Agreement. Similarly, article 22.3(g) defines "agreement" as being:
(1) with respect to goods, the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods taken
as a whole along with the Plurilateral Trade Agreements; 31 (2) with respect to
services, the GATS; and (3) with respect to intellectual property rights, the TRIPS
Agreement.
Article 22.3(d) further directs that in applying the principles described above,
the party is required to take into account two factors: (1) trade in the relevant
sector and the importance of that trade to the complaining party; and (2) "the
broader economic elements related to the nullification or impairment and the

25. DSU, supra note 2, art. 22.3(a).
26. Id. art. 22.3(b).
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. Id. art. 22.3(f)(i)-(iii).
30. Id. art. 22.3(f)(ii), n. 14.
31. The Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft; the Agreement on Government Procurement;
the International Dairy Agreement; and the Bovine Meat Agreement. See DSU, supra note 2, Appendix
1.
VOL. 32, NO. 3
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broader economic consequences of the suspension of concessions or other obligations."
Article 22.4 stipulates that "[t]he level of suspension of concessions or other
obligations. . . shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment."
As discussed below, the appropriate level of suspension of concessions may be
submitted to binding arbitration under article 22.6 and 22.7 at the request of the
losing defendant. Such binding arbitration has not to date occurred.
Finally, article 22.5 provides that "[t]he DSB shall not authorize suspension
of concessions or other obligations if a covered agreement prohibits such suspension."
4. Step 4: Obtain DSB authorization
The last step in the implementation/suspension process occurs if a losing defendant does not implement by the end of the "reasonable period of time," established in accordance with the provisions of article 21.3-4, the findings of the
panel report. In this event, the winning complainant has the right to request,
pursuant to article 22.6, authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations,
and this request may be rejected by the DSB only on the basis of a consensus
(i.e., including the requesting complainant). Article 22.6 further provides that
if the losing defendant either objects to the level of suspension proposed or claims
that the article 22.3 "principles and procedures" have not been followed, it can
refer the matter to arbitration. In that event, the arbitration shall be completed
within sixty days of the expiry of the reasonable period, and shall be carried out
by the members of the original panel, if they are available. The winning complainant may not suspend concessions until this process is completed.
5. Step 5: Suspend concessions
Article 22.8 further provides that the suspension of concessions is to be "temporary" and applied only until the measure found to be inconsistent is removed or
provides a "solution" to the nullification or impairment. Article 22.8 further
provides that the DSB is required to maintain on its agenda "the implementation
of adopted recommendations or rulings, including those cases where compensation has been provided or concessions or other obligations have been suspended
but the recommendations ...have not been implemented."
To date, no WTO Member has requested authorization to suspend concessions
against another WTO Member.
III. Implementation of Panel and Appellate Body Reports to Date:
A Status Report on the Implementation Process
A.

SUMMARY

This section will examine and analyze the factual history and the implementation process attendant to the eight cases with respect to which a defending WTO
FALL 1998

766

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

Member has been found by a panel and/or the Appellate Body not to be in
conformity with its WTO obligations and, as a result, has had to implement or is
in the process of implementing the recommendations of the panel and/or Appellate
Body.
B.

CASE HISTORIES

1. U.S. -Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline
On January 17, 1996, a panel convened at the request of Venezuela and Brazil
decided that regulations under the U.S. Clean Air Act of 1990, promulgated by
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in December 1993,32 did not
meet the requirements of article 111:4 of the GATT and could not be justified
under article XX, paragraphs (b), (d) or (g) 3 The United States appealed the
decision and the Appellate Body largely affirmed (albeit using different reasoning)
in a decision issued April 29, 1996." 4 The DSB formally adopted the ruling on
May 20, 1996. 35
The EPA regulations sought to maintain pollution emissions from gasoline
36
combustion at their 1990 levels (or reduce them to those levels). Under the U.S.

regulations, domestic refiners were required to establish an individual baseline
representing the quality of gasoline produced by that refiner in 1990. In calculating
individual "baselines," domestic producers were allowed to select and apply
one of three methods,37 while importers were restricted to using one of only two
methods.
Upon the issuance of the Appellate Body decision, USTR committed to imple-

32. The regulation is formally entitled Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives-Standardsfor
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline. 40 C.F.R. 80.
33. United States-StandardsforReformulatedand Conventional Gasoline-Reporton the Panel,
WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996) [hereinafter WTO Panel Report, U.S-Gasoline] (visited July 27, 1998)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/online/ddf.htm> [hereinafter WTO Website].
34. See United States-Standardsfor Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline-AB-1996--Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report
U.S.-Gasoline], at WTO Website, supra note 33. Although the panel's decision related to both
reformulated and conventional gasoline, the Appellate Body decision required changes solely with
respect to conventional gasoline pollutant levels. Under the EPA's existing rules, discriminatory
treatment of foreign refiners of reformulated gasoline was already scheduled to be phased out by
January 1, 1998. See, e.g., U.S. Will Comply with WTO Gas Panel, But Does Not Say How, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, June 21, 1996.

35. AdministrationAgrees to Comply with WTO Gas Panel by Next August, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Aug. 16, 1996.
36. WTO Panel Report, U.S.-Gasoline, supra note 33, para. 2.5.
37. See Appellate Body Report U.S.-Gasoline, supra note 34, at 5. The three methods were
as follows: (1) Method 1 would utilize quality data and volume records of the refiner's 1990 gasoline;
(2) Method 2 would allow domestic refiners to use their 1990 gasoline blendstock quality data and
1990 blendstock production records where data from Method 1 were unavailable; and (3) Method
3 would allow domestic refiners to establish individual 1990 baselines on the basis of their post-1990
gasoline blendstock data modeled to show 1990 gasoline composition where data from both Methods
1 and 2 were unavailable. Id.
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ment the decision, but declined initially to state how it would do so." Congress
was critical of the WTO decision 39 and implemented an FY 1996 appropriations
rider preventing the EPA from allocating money in order to promulgate new
regulations that would give effect to the decision.'
On June 19, 1996, within the thirty-day period, the United States affirmed
that it would "examine any and all options for compliance," while taking into
consideration the "key criterion" of "protecting public health and the environment." 4' Accordingly, the EPA commenced a ninety-day comment period seeking
public participation in a rule-making process to amend the existing rule.42
U.S. gasoline industry members, as well as Venezuela and Brazil, submitted
comments as part of the public comment process. The Independent Refiners
Coalition (IRC), which led the 1993 lobbying effort that produced the EPA rule,
submitted a proposal to allow foreign refiners the same flexibility as domestic
refiners have in meeting U.S. pollutant standards. 43 However, the IRC also proposed that foreign refiners should be subject to certain import volume restrictions. 44 Venezuelan and Brazilian refiners submitted their own proposals allowing
foreign refiners to set their own pollutant baselines. 45
In August 1996, the United States reached a tentative agreement with Venezuela
for a fifteen-month implementation period.46 The United States was unable to
reach a similar agreement with Brazil, 47 which insisted on an eight- to nine-month
implementation plan, a timeframe the United States rejected on the grounds that
the EPA typically requires twenty-four to thirty months to revise regulations. 48
Throughout the implementation period, both Brazil and Venezuela continued to
raise the issue at the monthly meetings of the DSB.49
38. See, e.g., WTO Body Faults U.S on EPA Rule, but Reverses on Conversation Exception,
INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Apr. 30, 1996.
39. WTO Supports Venezuela in Decision on Foreign Refiner Rule, 21ST CENTURY FUELS, Feb.
1, 1997. Senator Bob Dole, a presidential candidate at the time, condemned the WTO ruling as an
"attack on the sovereignty of U.S. law." Id.
40. Id.
41. U.S. Will Comply with WTO Gas Panel, But Does Not Say How, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, June
21, 1996.
42. Id.
43. Refiners Suggest Giving Importers Equal Treatment to Settle Gas Fight, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Oct. 18, 1996.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. This agreement was formally announced at the December 3, 1996 meeting of the DSB. U.S.
Again Rejects Japan Proposal on Liquor Panel Implementation, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan. 31, 1997.
47. Administration Agrees to Comply with WTO Gas Panel by Next August, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Aug. 16, 1996.
48. Id. The EPA rulemaking process requires, inter alia, that proposed changes are published
in the Federal Register and that they are approved by the Office of Management and Budget.
49. Venezuela, Brazil Press U.S. on Implementation of Gas Panel Ruling, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Jan. 24, 1997. At the January 22, 1997 meeting of the DSB, Venezuela and Brazil expressed concern
that the United States would not bring regulations into conformity with the WTO decision by the
August 20, 1997 deadline. The parties were concerned at the number of steps required in order to
formally promulgate regulations under U.S. law. Id.
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In January 1997, the EPA issued a draft proposal in an attempt to comply
with the Appellate Body decision. 50 The proposal included provisions subjecting
foreign and domestic refiners to the same standards, with the additional requirement that foreign refiners provide information on transportation methods, as well
as test data and documentation establishing the source of their gasoline. Under
the new rules, foreign refiners would have the option-denied them under the
prior regulation-of using individual baselines to certify conventional gasoline.5'
The EPA finalized the new regulations on August 27, 1997, one day before
the expiration of the fifteen-month deadline.52 Brazil and Venezuela expressed
satisfaction with the new regulations.
As the first WTO case to test the implementation provisions of the DSU, the
United States-Gasolinecase is noteworthy in two respects. First, implementation
was accomplished within the fifteen-month guidepost established at article
21.3(c). In the context of this case, the use of the fifteen-month suggested timeframe as target is both good news and bad news, but mostly good news. The
United States rejected the shorter period of time requested by Brazil, and an
argument could be made that, given the history of the provision, speedier action
might have been possible. However, as a practical matter, fifteen months is a
relatively quick turnaround for agency action on this type of issue.
Second, both the problem raised and the decision in the case were relatively
uncomplicated: de jure differential treatment that had to be effectively equalized.
In other words, the decision did not leave room for much disagreement between
the complaining and defending parties over the actions that needed to be taken.
Political constituencies were placed on notice as to what steps would have to be
taken and could begin to prepare substantive and political positions to accommodate themselves to that end result. As we discuss below, future cases may not
always be as straightforward.
2. Japan-Taxeson Alcoholic Beverages
On July 11, 1996, a panel convened at the request of the European Union
(EU), Canada, and the United States found that Japan's taxation scheme, under
which it assessed higher taxes on various imported liquor products than on domestically-produced shochu, was inconsistent with Japan's obligations under article

50. Refiners Offer New Proposalfor EPA to Comply with WTO Gas Ruling, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Feb. 7, 1997.
51. EPA Gives Foreign Refiners Option to Set Individual Baselines, OCTANE WK., Aug. 25,
1997.
52. Based on Outcome Of WTO Dispute about Imported Gasoline, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency Issues Baseline Requirements for Foreign Gasoline, INT'L LAW UPDATE, Oct. 7, 1997. The
effective date of the rule is August 27, 1997. Id.

VOL. 32, NO. 3

PERFORMANCE OF THE SYSTEM IV: IMPLEMENTATION

769

111:2, of the GATT 1994. 53 On October 4, 1996, the Appellate Body affirmed,
with some modification, the panel's determination. The decision was formally
adopted by the DSB on November 1, 1996. 54
Japan acknowledged its obligation to implement the terms of the Appellate
Body decision, but sought a "reasonable" period of time within which to comply. 55 Japan did not propose a particular period of time to the DSB as provided
at article 21.3(a); rather, it indicated that it would initiate negotiations with the
EU, Canada and the United States on what would constitute a "reasonable period"
in this case.
In December 1996, Japan proposed an implementation plan to be instituted
in three stages over five years, allowing Japan to retain a three percent greater
tax on foreign liquors than on its domestic shochu.56 The EU was able to reach
agreement with Japan on an accelerated reduction of the tariff rates on whisky
and brandy as compensation for delayed implementation on other products. The
EU indicated that this agreement did not prejudge their position on the issue of
a "reasonable period of time."
The United States rejected Japan's proposal and insisted that Japan meet-at
a minimum-the notional fifteen-month deadline set out at article 21.3(c). 57 When
the parties were unable to come to a satisfactory agreement within forty-five
days of the adoption of the Appellate Body report, the United States, on December
24, 1996, requested arbitration pursuant to article 21.3(c) of the DSU. 5"
Even as the United States moved to invoke the arbitration process, Japan
continued to argue that it would not be able to comply with a fifteen-month
implementation deadline, even if an arbitrator were to so decide, because of
53. See generally Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages-Report of the Panel, WT/DS8/R at
121 (July 11, 1996) [hereinafter WTO Panel Report Japan Liquor], at WTO Website, supra note
33.
54. Formal adoption of the WTO ruling was initially delayed when Japan objected to the absence
of a proper quorum at the October 29, 1996 meeting of the DSB. See Japan Uses ProceduralMove
to Delay Adoption of Liquor Report, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 1, 1996. This is the only time that
a WTO Member has used this extraordinary procedural objection to block, albeit temporarily, one
of the four key steps in the dispute settlement process. See id.
55. See WTO PanelFormedon Helms-Burton; JapanAccepts Liquor Ruling, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Nov. 22, 1996.
56. See U.S. Requests Arbitration Over Japan's Implementation of Liquor Panel, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Jan. 10, 1997. Specifically, the Japanese plan would raise the tax on shochu from 4.084
yen per liter per proof to 6.028 yen in October 1997, to 7.976 yen in October 1998, and to 9.924
yen in October 2001. See Masato Ishizawa, WTO Ruling Pushes Shochu Makers to Reinvent Product,
THE NIKKEI WKLY., Mar. 31, 1997. The tax on whiskey would be reduced from 24.558 yen per
liter per proof to 13.775 yen in October 1997 and to 10.225 yen in October 1998. See id.
57. See U.S. Again Rejects Japan Proposal on Liquor Panel Implementation, supra note 46.
58. See U.S. Requests Arbitration Over Japan's Implementation of Liquor Panel, supra note
56. When the United States and Japan were unable to agree on the appointment of an arbitrator
within the ten days envisaged under article 21.3(c), the United States requested that the WTO DirectorGeneral do so. The Director-General appointed Ambassador Julio LaCarte, the Presiding Member
of the Appellate Body panel that had decided the Japan-Liquorappeal. See id.
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domestic political opposition and the complexities involved in changing its tax
code.59 In mid-January 1997, Japan attempted to forestall the arbitration process
by offering to accelerate its tax cuts on U.S. bourbon such that it would bring
itself into full compliance by 2001.60 The United States again rejected the offer. 6'
The arbitrator decided that all of the original parties to the dispute could "participate" in the arbitration process, notwithstanding that the United States alone
had requested binding arbitration. The EC, in particular, had sought to join the
proceeding out of concern that the United States might be able to strike a better
deal with Japan as a result of the arbitration decision than the EC had already
negotiated. In response, Japan agreed that the EC would have further negotiation
rights in the event that the United States obtained a more favorable arrangement
through arbitration.62
The arbitral decision focused on the interpretation of the last sentence of article
21.3(c), which provides: "[h]owever ...the reasonable period of time may
be shorter or longer than the fifteen months, depending upon the 'particular
circumstances.' -63 The United States argued that only two sets of criteria were
relevant to the interpretation of the term "particular circumstances:" (1) "the
type (legislation, regulation, decree, etc.) and technical complexity (e.g. making
a simple change in a tariff rate, as compared to making more complex changes
like the development of a new scientific standard) of the measures that the Member
must draft, adopt and implement;" and (2) "the minimum period of time in
which the Member can achieve implementation, assuming that the Member acts in
good faith.' 64The United States argued that the term "particular circumstances"
should not "imply a policy judgment, but rather a technical inquiry into the
65
domestic legislative or regulatory system in the Member country concerned."
The United States argued strongly against including political considerations in
the timing decision, stating: "[t]he question for the arbitrator is what is the
shortest period of time in which implementation can practicably take place, not
59. See U.S. Rejects Japan Tariff Deal in Liquor Panel Implementation Fight, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Jan. 17, 1997. An unidentified Finance Ministry official said that it would be too difficult
for Japan to change its reform plan, as it had already submitted a proposal to the Diet. See Japan
to Do Its Best for Liquor Tax Accord with U.S., JAPAN EcON. NEWSWIRE, Feb. 17, 1997.

60. See Uruguay Official Appointed to Mediate Liquor Tax Dispute Between U.S., Japan, INT'L
(BNA),Jan. 21, 1997.
61. See U.S., Japan Agree to Extend Liquor Panel Arbitration Deadline, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Jan. 24, 1997. The parties agreed to extend the normal ninety-day deadline for completion of the
arbitration process before the request for arbitration was made only on the fiftieth day. See also
Julio Lacarte-Mur6, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Arbitration under article 21. (c) of the
Understandingon Rules and ProceduresGoverning the Settlement of Disputes, WT/DS8/15 at para.
3 (Feb. 14, 1997) [hereinafter Arbitrator's Decision Japan Liquor], at WTO Website, supra note
33.
62. See EU, JapanAgree on Implementation of WTO Liquor Tax Decision, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Feb. 7, 1997.
63. Arbitrator's Decision Japan Liquor, supra note 61, para. 11.
64. Id. para. 12.
65. Id.para. 13.
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whether a longer period of time would make66implementation less burdensome
and painful for the implementing Member."
Japan argued that the term "reasonable period of time" should be interpreted
in light of the DSU's general objective of prompt compliance, but also the DSU's
clear allowance for flexibility in implementation, as reflected in the "particular
circumstances" language. Japan argued the "particular circumstances" language
of article 21.3 justified its proposed three-phase, twenty-three-month/five-year
plan on the grounds that: (1) the executive has limited powers over taxation and
there is a need for formal legislation to implement the decision; (2) the adverse
effects of the liquor and consumption tax increases will have on Japanese consumers, and that such increases are normally carried out in one-year increments; and
(3) the "administrative constraints" on the execution of taxation, namely that
the changes will have to be notified and explained to 180,000 wholesalers and
retailers in advance and that these businesses will need time to adjust their computer programs and advertising materials.67
The EC argued that the "reasonable period of time" should, in general, be
fifteen months. Canada argued that Japan's proposal clearly fell outside the "reasonable period of time." In addition, Canada made two further points concerning
the "particular circumstances" language: (1) that the term should be applied on
a sui generis basis, based on the unique facts of each case; and (2) Japan's
argument that the greater tax differential with respect to shochu B than with
respect to shochu A qualifies as a "particular circumstance" was tantamount to
arguing that "the greater the degree of inconsistency with WTO obligations, the
greater the period of time a Member should 8be granted to bring that measure
6
into conformity with the WTO Agreement.,
The arbitral decision did not address any of these arguments. Instead, in a
terse, one-paragraph "award," the arbitrator asserted:
[i]n this case, I am not persuaded that the "particular circumstances" advanced by
Japan and the United States justify a departure from the 15-month "guideline" either
way. I conclude, therefore, that a "reasonable period of time" within the meaning of
article 21.3(c) of the DSU for Japan to implement the recommendations and rulings
of the DSB of INovember 1996 in Japan-Taxeson Alcoholic Beverages is 15 months.69
Despite the arbitration ruling, Japan continued to resist U.S. demands to implement the WTO decision fully by February 1998. Japanese officials reiterated that
the ruling would require approval from Japan's Diet, that there was considerable
domestic political opposition to the proposed changes,7 ° and that Japan needed

66. Id.
67. Id. paras. 17-21.
68. Id. para. 26.
69. Id. para. 27.
70. See JapanSearching ForResponseto WTO ArbitrationRuling on Liquor, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Feb. 21, 1997.
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time to notify its 180,000 shochu wholesalers and retailers of the changes and
to allow for market adjustments. 7'
In June 1997, the U.S. and Japan returned to negotiations on the implementation
issue; 72 however, the talks again failed to result in an agreement. Japan proceeded
with its own implementation plan.73
On December 17, 1997, the United States announced that it had reached a
settlement with Japan.74 Under the terms of the settlement, Japan committed to
adjust excise taxes on shochu A by May, 1, 1998. In turn, excise taxes on shochu
B would be adjusted by October 1, 2000. Japan further agreed to undertake a
number of additional changes, including: (1) elimination of tariffs on all brown
spirits (including whisky and brandy), vodka, rum, liqueurs, and gin by April
1, 2002; (2) disclosure of any measures or subsidies for Japan's domestic distilled
spirits industry that the government might undertake; and (3) disclosure of any
existing measures that may nullify or impair the benefits of the settlement.75
The Japan-Liquorcase is significant in at least two key respects. First, the case
illustrates the range of possibilities available both to prevailing parties seeking to
enforce a WTO decision and defending parties seeking to implement within the
DSU's parameters.76 In this instance, while two of the prevailing parties (Canada
and the EC) negotiated an agreement with the losing country (Japan), the United
States held out for a better deal and one more consistent, in the U.S. view, with DSU
requirements. When the United States invoked the binding arbitration provisions of
article 21.3(c), the other complaining parties joined in and all three benefited from
the result. From the vantagepoint of losing countries, the case illustrates that WTOinconsistent measures can be phased out or brought into compliance over substantially longer than the benchmark fifteen months of article 21, provided that sufficient other concessions are made to compensate for the longer phaseout.
71. See id.; see also Japan to Continue Talks with U.S. on Liquor Taxes, INT'L TRADE DAILY
(BNA), Feb. 19, 1997. Japanese Ministry of Finance officials have expressed the need for the
extended five-year plan in order to protect shochu makers, all of which Japan claims are small,
economically-fragile businesses that endured tax hikes of seventy-five percent in 1989 and forty-five
percent in 1994 in spite of double-digit declines in demand. See id.
72. See Japan, U.S. Resume Talks on Liquor Tax Gaps, JAPAN WKLY. MONITOR, June 9, 1997.
73. See JapaneseLiquor Taxes Still an Issue, JEI REP., Mar. 7, 1997. For example, during the
first week of October 1997, Japan lowered the price of a 0.7 liter bottle of whisky by about 300
yen, and raised the price of a 1.8 liter bottle of shochu by about 90 yen. See Liquor Tax Changes
Buoying Whiskey Makers, JIJl PRESS TICKER SERV., Sept. 29, 1997.
74. Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. Settles Successful WTO Case Opening
Japanese Marketfor DistilledSpirits and Eliminating DiscriminatoryTaxes and Tariffs, USTR Press
Release, Dec. 17, 1997; see also U.S. Claims Victory in WTO Settlement with Japan Over Liquor
Tax, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 19, 1997.
75. See U.S. Settles Successful WTO Case Opening Japanese Market for Distilled Spirits and
Eliminating Discriminatory Taxes and Tariffs, supra note 74.
76. See id. Based on the WTO rules, the United States could be given a remedy even if Japan
fails to comply with the arbitrator's ultimate determination, because the United States would then
be entitled to compensation. See U.S., Japan Agree to Extend Liquor Panel Arbitration Deadline,
supra note 61.
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Second, the arbitrator's decision, in its terse rejection-without any reasoned
elaboration-of the guideposts proposed by the United States and Japan for interpreting the "particular circumstances" language of article 21.3(c) provides little
guidance to future parties or arbitrators as to what types of situations, if any,
may qualify for "particular circumstances" treatment. In so doing, the decision
provides little guidance as to the circumstances, if any, under which parties may
be required to implement in less than fifteen months or, in the alternative, the
circumstances, if any, in which parties may be able to take more than fifteen
months. In fact, the decision leaves the impression that fifteen months will be
the norm absent a compelling case to the contrary.
In our view, the arbitrator's decision is disappointing in two respects from
the standpoint of effective application of the implementation provisions of the
DSU. First, the decision appears to place more emphasis than seems warranted
under the DSU text on the fifteen-month benchmark. Second, the decision missed
an important opportunity to begin to define the parameters of what may qualify
as "particular circumstances." For example, both the United States and Japan
proposed that one consideration should be the type of measure at issue: e.g.,
regulation versus legislation, or, in short, whether executive branch action alone
will suffice or whether action by the legislature is required. This would appear
to be a useful parameter, albeit one that should not be applied mechanically.
The other factors suggested by the United States and Japan also deserved
discussion, although the merits of these factors are less clear. For example, the
U.S. suggestion that the arbitrator determine the minimum period of time that
a measure could be implemented in good faith could entail a highly intrusive
and subjective evaluation of a country's capacity for taking action. Similarly,
Japan's second proffered factor-adverse impact on constituencies-would invite
a consideration of the degree of benefit domestic constituencies were receiving
from a measure, and the magnitude of the consequent loss of those benefits
when the measure was reformed or removed, as a potentially mitigating factor
in implementation. As the Government of Canada aptly observed, considering
this factor could enable governments to attempt to delay implementation for the
longest time of measures that were the most inconsistent with WTO obligations.
Japan's third proffered factor, "administrative constraints," has greater validity;
however, it would need to be examined with a careful and critical eye to ensure
that any such "constraints" were actual and not simply convenient excuses.
In sum, the arbitrator's decision, by its brevity, preserved the maximum latitude
for future arbitrators' interpretations of article 23.1 (c). That benefit, in our view,
is more than offset by the lack of guidance the decision provides to parties considering use of binding arbitration in future cases.
3. U.S. -Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear
On November 8, 1996, a panel convened at the request of Costa Rica concluded
that the United States violated its obligations under articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the
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Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) by imposing a safeguard quota on
imports of Costa Rican-produced underwear without having demonstrated that
the imports caused serious damage or actual threat of damage.77 Costa Rica had
requested that the panel recommend, in accordance with article 19.1 of the DSU, 75
that the United States immediately withdraw the offending measure. 79 In accordance with Costa Rica's request, the panel recommended prompt removal of the
measure and withdrawal of the quantitative restrictions imposed by the measure. 0
Costa Rica appealed the decision and on February 10, 1997, the Appellate Body
upheld the panel determination, with certain modifications."s
In response to the ruling, the United States decided to allow the measure to
expire on March 27, 1997, stating" 'we ...have no intention of doing anything
further and consider ourselves in line with what the [World Trade Organization]
panel recommended.' ,,82
4. U.S. -Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and
Blouses from India
On January 6, 1997, a panel convened at the request of India determined
that the United States violated its obligations under articles 2 and 6 of the
ATC by imposing a transitional safeguard restraint on imports of woven wool
shirts and blouses from India. 3 The panel further concluded that the U.S.
action constituted a prima facie case of nullification or impairment of the
benefits accruing to India under the ATC. India appealed certain issues of
law in the panel report. On April 25, 1997, the Appellate Body affirmed the
legal findings and conclusions of the panel, 5 and the DSB formally adopted
the decision on May 23, 1997.
77. See United States-Restrictionson Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre UnderwearReport of the Panel, WT/DS24/R para. 7.47-7.55, (Nov. 8, 1996) [hereinafter WTO Panel Report
U.S.-Fibre Underwear], at WTO Website, supra note 33. The panel further concluded that the
United States violated article 6.6(d) of the ATC by not granting treatment more favorable to Costa
Rican re-imports. Id.paras. 7.56-7.59.
78. Article 19.1 of the DSU provides:
Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with
a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the member concerned bring the measure
into conformity with that agreement. In addition to its recommendations, the panel
or Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the member concerned could implement
the recommendations. Id. para. 8.1 ((footnotes omitted) (citing to art. 19.1)).
79. Id.para. 3.2.
80. Id.para. 8.3.
81. United States-Restrictionson Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear-Report
of the Appellate Body, WT/DS24/AB/R (Feb. 10, 1997), at WTO Website, supra note 33.
82. Jim Ostroff, Costa Rica Underwear Quota Dropped, DAILY NEWS REC., Apr. 2, 1997.
83. United States-MeasuresAffecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from IndiaReport of the Panel, WT/DS33/R para. 8.1 (Jan. 6, 1997), at WTO Website, supra note 33.
84. Id.
85. United States-MeasuresAffecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from IndiaAB-1997-1-Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997), at WTO Website,
supra note 33.
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In practical terms, the WTO decision had little effect on imports of Indian
woven wool shirts and blouses, because the United States withdrew the quotas
in December 1996, after U.S. officials noted a steady decline in imports. 86 Nevertheless, India termed the ruling an important "psychological victory.""
5. Canada-CertainMeasures Concerning Periodicals
On March 14, 1997, a DSB panel ruled in favor of the United States in its
complaint against Canada with respect to three measures. The panel held that:
(1) Tariff Code 9958, which prohibits the importation into Canada of certain
periodicals, is inconsistent with article XI: 1 of the GATT 1994; (2) Part V.I of
Canada's Excise Tax Act, which imposes an eighty percent tax on all advertisements contained in "split-run" edition periodicals, is inconsistent with article
111:2; and (3) Canada's application of a discounted postal rate for domesticallyproduced periodicals is not proscribed under article III since it constitutes a
subsidy paid exclusively to domestic producers justified under article III:8(b). s8
On June 30, 1997, the Appellate Body affirmed the panel's ruling with respect
to the first two measures, and reversed the panel's conclusion with respect to
article 111:8(b). 89 The DSB formally adopted the ruling on July 30, 1997.90
The Government of Canada pledged to implement the ruling, but also announced that it planned to introduce later in 1998 new measures to support domestic magazines 9'-for example, taxes on the advertiser rather than on the publisher,
and postal subsidies paid directly to domestic publishers rather than differential
postal rates for Canadian and foreign publishers. 92 In addition, Heritage Minister
Copps stated that her ministry would develop new measures "to protect the
Canadian magazine industry's share of advertising dollars." 93 Copps also published a discussion paper, which invited comments by March 20, 1998, on how the
Canadian film industry might be encouraged through subsidies or other protective
measures. Canada also began working to build support for its position among
86. See Manik Mehta, WTO Backs India in U.S. Textile Row, THE ETHNIC NEWSWATCH, Jan.
17, 1997.
87. See id.
88. Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals-Reportof the Panel, WT/DS31/R
para. 6.1 (Mar. 14, 1997) [hereinafter WTO Panel Report Canada-Periodicals],at WTO Website,
supra note 33.
89. Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals-AB-1997-2-Report of the Appellate
Body, WT/DS3 1/AB/R at 34 (June 30, 1997) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report Canada-Periodicals], at WTO Website, supra note 33.
90. See Canada: Plans Coming Next Month for U.S. Magazine Ruling, E. TIMES, July 30, 1997.
91. See John Schofield, Back to Square One, MACLEAN'S, July 14, 1997.
92. See Reconcile Global Trade with Cultural Sovereignty, THE FIN. POST (Toronto), July 22,
1997.
93. John Schofield, Back to Square One, MACLEAN'S, July 14, 1997. By contrast, Trade
Minister Art Eggleton questioned the viability of maintaining protective measures and argued
that the survival of the country's cultural industries should depend on their " 'ability to find an
international audience.' " Marci McDonald, Menacing Magazines, MACLEAN'S, Mar. 24, 1997
(quoting Minister Art Eggleton).
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potential allies such as France, Italy, and certain countries in the Pacific Rim
and Central and South America by casting the issue broadly as a question of
preservation of cultural sovereignty and national cultural policies.94 At the same
time, Canadian magazine publishers, concerned that they would be unable to
raise advertising revenue without the favorable laws, started changing the appearance and content of their publications and called on the Canadian government
to negotiate a settlement with the United States that would allow some protection
of Canadian magazines before Canada was required to implement the WTO
ruling. 95
In response and to warn Canada against any new protectionist initiatives, the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) asked U.S. film and other
"cultural" industries to identify Canadian government practices that cause them
harm. The USTR requested industry comments by February 23, 1998, and stated
that it would investigate them and possibly seek further remedies against the
Government of Canada.9 6 Thereafter, on July 29, Canada announced that it would
revoke Tariff Code 9958 and part V.1. of Canada's Excise Tax Act, and that
the postal rate subsidies would be replaced with direct subsidies to Canadian
magazines. However, Canada also announced that it would prevent Canadian
advertising from purchasing ads in non-Canadian magazines. 97 The United States
responded that such a prohibition "would be every bit as inconsistent with Canada's international trade obligations as its current discriminatory practices.' 9'
6. European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale, and
Distribution of Bananas
On May 22, 1997, a panel convened at the request of Ecuador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, and the United States determined that the EC's banana import
regime and its licensing procedures for the importation of bananas were inconsistent with various obligations of the GATT 1994 and related WTO Agreements.
The EC appealed certain aspects of the panel ruling. In its September 9, 1997

94. See Lawrence Herman, Canada Not Close to Losing National Cultural Policy, THE FIN.
POST (Toronto), Feb. 26, 1997. Canada has also suggested that it would push harder for a renegotiation
of cultural exemptions for Canadian "cultural" products and services in NAFTA and other trade
agreements such as the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), currently being negotiated in
the OECD. See Canada Trade: WTO Ruling Raises Ante for Domestic Magazines, EIU VIEWSWIRE,
Sept. 12, 1997. The United States responded by reiterating its opposition to cultural exemptions,
including any additional provisions in the NAFTA or MAI. See John Schofield, Publish or Perish,
MACLEAN'S, June 2, 1997.
95. See id.
96. See Courtney Tower, Canada, US Solicit Advice from Citizens on Reel Matters, J. OF COM.,
Feb. 9, 1998.
97. CanadaGives Groundin BorderDisputeover Magazines, but the UnitedStates is not Satisfied,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1998.
98. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Press Release 98-70 (July 29, 1998).
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report, the Appellate Body upheld most aspects of the panel decision. 99 The DSB
adopted the report on September 15, 1997.
The WTO decision caused a predictable split within the EC. Six EC-Member
States, led by the United Kingdom, Spain, and France, together with EC Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler, strongly objected to implementing the required changes, and argued for protection of the economies of their former colonies.1 00These countries urged alternatives to compliance with the WTO decision,
such as payment of compensation to the complainants. The European Parliament
also voiced its support for the continuation of trade preferences for AfricanCaribbean-Pacific (ACP) banana growers under the Lomd Convention.' 0' On the
other hand, nine EC-Member States led by Germany and the Netherlands expressed support for implementation of the WTO decision and the hope that it
would reduce EC market prices for bananas by increasing imports of the cheaper
Latin American varieties.' 02
Despite the internal conflict among its members, the EC committed publicly
to complying with the WTO decision. 0 3 However, the EC refused to disclose
any details on an implementation plan until "a later date. '"'04 The EC also commented that it would maintain some trade preferences for ACP-produced bananas,
particularly bananas produced in Caribbean countries, arguing that full implementation would effectively eliminate the Caribbean banana industry.'l 5
The United States declared that it would accept only a full dismantling of the
EC banana regime.' 06 The United States also protested the EC's refusal to provide
opportunities for "informal consultations" so that interested parties might participate in the implementation process. 07
In response, the EC stated that it is not required by the DSU-prior to the
expiration of the implementation deadline-to negotiate with the United States
or other complainants on the substance of the changes it intends to make to its
99. European Communities-Regime For the Importation, Sale and Distribution of BananasAB-1997-3, WT/DS27/AB/R at 107 (Sept. 9, 1997) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report EC-Bananas], at WTO Website, supra note 33.
100. See EU Accepts Ruling On Banana Regime, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1997.
101. See Bananas: EU Agree To Abide By WTO Ruling, EUR. REP., Sept. 27, 1997.

102. See Michael Mann, Europe Won't Import More Bananasfrom Latin America, INFOLATINA,
Jan. 15, 1998.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. An EC communique states that, without the import licensing arrangements, "Caribbean
bananas are not able to compete with cheaper Latin American bananas ... with devastating consequences not only for the banana industry, but also for the economic, social and political stability of
the Caribbean countries." Martin Burdett, CaribbeanFaces Economic Ruin Over Banana Trade,
THE ETHNIC NEWSWATCH WKLY. J., Apr. 1, 1997.

106. See id.

107. EU, USMake Case to Arbitratoron BananasNext Week, INSIDE U.S.

TRADE,

Dec. 19, 1997.

The United States argues that in implementing U.S.-Standardsfor Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline it allowed Venezuela, Brazil and other interested parties the opportunity to participate in
the public comment process. See id.
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banana import regime. 0 8 Instead, EC officials contend they will be required to
consult on substantive issues only if the EC's actions are found, after expiration
of the reasonable period for implementation, to be out of conformity with the
EC's international obligations. 09
The EC's unwillingness to specify an implementation plan foreshadowed a
potentially substantial dispute between itself and at least some of the complainant
countries, particularly the United States, over two issues: (1) what constitutes
"adequate" implementation of the WTO decision; and (2) the extent of a losing
defendant's obligations to explain and carry out implementation steps during the
"reasonable period."
On November 17, 1997, unsatisfied with EC statements concerning implementation, the United States, Honduras, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Mexico requested
binding arbitration"0 . The complainants asserted that the EC was not entitled to
the full fifteen-month implementation period because, inter alia, the EC had not
explicitly stated its intention to implement the WTO decision fully."'
On January 8, 1998, the WTO-appointed arbitrator, Appellate Body Member
Said El-Naggar, found that the EC would have fifteen months and one week to
implement the WTO decision and bring its banana import regime into compliance. "2 In so finding, the arbitrator accepted the EC's position that "the complexity of the implementation process" justified the fifteen-month period." 3 The
arbitrator also concluded that "[t]he complaining parties have not persuaded me
that there are 'particular circumstances' in this case to justify a shorter period
4
of time for implementation.""
The arbitrator's "award" in this case included only slightly more articulated
reasoning than did the award in the Japan-Liquordecision. After rejecting the
complainants' request for an implementation period shorter than fifteen months,
the EC-Bananas arbitrator stated: "At the same time, the complexity of the
implementation process, demonstrated by the European Communities, would
suggest adherence to the guideline."" 5
This language in the decision suggests two conclusions that may be relevant to
future cases. First, the arbitrator noted that the "complexity of the implementation
process" was "demonstrated" by the implementing member. This comment
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id. The United States maintains the EU has merely stated it would abide by its international
obligations. See id.
112. Said E1-Naggar, European Communities-Regimefor the Importation, Sale, and Distribution
of Bananas-Arbitration UnderArticle 21.3 (c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WT/DS27/15 at 6 (Jan. 7, 1998) [hereinafter Bananas Arbitration],
at WTO Website, supra note 33.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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suggests that implementing countries will have to demonstrate the asserted complexity of an implementation process and not simply assert such complexity. In
the EC's case, the elements of "complexity" included: (1) the EC's having to
"strike a difficult balance" in amending its banana import regime between its
WTO obligations and its obligations under the Lom6 Convention;" 6 (2) "a complex legislative procedure" involving a number of different entities within the
EC; "7 (3) the requirement under the Lom6 Convention of consultation with ACP
States prior to taking definitive action;' (4) requirements that "administrative
changes" affecting customs treatment of products enter into force only on January
1 or July 1 of each year; and (5) a "reasonable lead time" to notify private
parties in the "banana supply chain" to make the necessary adjustments. "'
The arbitral decision does not specify which of these factors the arbitrator may
have found most persuasive. Certainly, the EC could make a strong case that
its regime was administratively cumbersome and that altering it would also be
administratively cumbersome. In that regard, the arbitrator's decision appropriately takes into account practicality. However, from a policy standpoint, there
is little reason that administratively cumbersome forms of protection should be
given greater leeway in implementation than simpler forms of protection. 20
The arbitral decision may have relevance also in that it states that it is the
"complexity of the implementation process" that "suggests adherence to the
[fifteen-month] guideline." This indicates, somewhat in distinction to the first
arbitral decision, that even implementing Members that can demonstrate "complexity" will have to implement within the fifteen-month period.
Finally, the arbitral decision can be considered a "win," however modest,
for the complaining countries, in one respect. Prior to the arbitral proceeding,
the complaining countries had asserted that the EC had not committed itself to
full implementation within the fifteen-month period. The decision noted, however, that at the hearing, the EC did in fact commit to full implementation within
the time to be specified by the arbitrator.'2
On January 14, 1998, the EC adopted a proposal to modify its banana regime.
The EC's proposal is almost as byzantine as the existing regime and we will not
get into the details of it here. However, it is notable in two key respects: (1) it
appears to hold out the promise of shifting existing quota allocations in a way
that favors, to some extent, certain complainants in the case over or more than

116. See id. at2.
117. Seeid.
118. See id. at 3.
119. See id.
120. Indeed, prior to the Japan-Film decision, the GATT/WTO had developed a long and impressive history of striking down nontransparent and/or indirect forms of protection. See, e.g., GATT
Dispute Panel Report on Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, Oct. 23,
1958, GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp) at 60 (1959).
121. See Bananas Arbitration, supra note 110, at 5.
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others; and (2) the proposal does so in a manner that is far from clear and depends
to a large extent on bilateral negotiations between the EC and each of the winning
WTO Members. The plan's opaqueness both makes it difficult to challenge and
plays to the potentially conflicting interests of the several WTO complainants.
The EC's proposal has succeeded in creating divisions among the complaining
countries. The United States, which initiated the complaint on behalf of Central
American banana producers such as Dole, Chiquita Brands, and Del Monte, has
stated that the draft proposal fails to meet the WTO rules and suggested that
additional U.S. challenges are likely.'22 The United States maintains that the
proposal would result in a "two-track tariff quota" that allocates restrictive quotas
to Latin American suppliers while continuing to provide ACP countries with
quotas that exceed their past shipments. 23 The United States would like to see
the EC abolish tariff quotas altogether and avoid allocating import licenses on
the basis of historic market share.' 24
By contrast, Ecuador, which was initially critical of the proposal, later stated
that it could "live with [the EC] reforms" if the new system allocates a market
share that reflects the money it has spent on licenses in the past. 25 Ecuador,
the largest country-supplier of bananas to the EC, apparently believes that new26
negotiating procedures under the EC proposal will increase its market share.'
As of July 1998, the United States and EU remained far apart over the EU's
implementation obligations. 27
' In particular, the USTR, Ambassador Barshefsky,
described a July 1998 EU plan for implementation as failing "to make any significant changes to bring the EC's regime in line with WTO provisions."-21
The EC's implementation of the EC-Bananas case, still a work in progress
as this comment goes to print, raises a number of important issues related to
implementation of panel decisions. First, as in the Canada-Periodicalscase,
the EC's statements and actions reveal that the implementation process under
the DSU is essentially apoliticalprocess comprised of at least two key dimensions.
The first dimension comprises the political dynamics within the losing WTO
Member: factors such as the nature and strength of domestic opposition to implementation; and tools that domestic constituencies have at their disposal to slow
or derail implementation.
The second political dimension of implementation is comprised of the political
dynamics within the WTO for slowing, mitigating, or derailing the impact of a
122. See Niccolo Sarno, EU Banana Rule Changes Endanger CaribbeanProducers, INTER PRESS
Jan. 15, 1998.
123. John Zaracostas, Changes to the EU Banana Import Regime Blasted, J. OF COM., Jan. 23,
1998.
124. See Ecuador Set to Drop Case, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 27, 1998.
125. Id.
126. See id.
127. Office of the Trade Representative, USTR Barshefsky Reacts to EU Banana Decision, Press
Release 98-63.
128. Id.
SERVICE,
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panel or Appellate Body decision on a domestic measure: e.g., mobilization of
other Members to support a losing defendant; sowing the seeds of opposition to
full implementation in one or more of the winning complainant Members (such
as the EC has attempted to do by arguing that by pressing for full implementation,
the United States would be responsible for the death of the Caribbean banana
industry and attendant economic, political and social consequences); and seeking
to divide and conquer winning complainant countries.
In short, the implementation process provides an opportunity for a losing defendant to open various political fronts to stall or mitigate implementation, possibly
even to "claw back" through implementation points that may have been lost in
the panel or Appellate Body stage. The process as it is unfolding in the ECBananas case underscores the highly political nature of the implementation process, albeit operating within some relatively loose juridical parameters.
In addition, the EC-Bananascase raises squarely the issue of to what extent
winning complainants have a right to participate in the formulation and ongoing
review-duringthe implementation period-of a losing defendant's implementation plan. Article 21.5 provides that "[w]here there is disagreement as to the
existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply
with the recommendations or rulings such dispute shall be decided through recourse to these dispute settlement procedures," including a "quickie" ninety-day
panel report.
In our view, to ensure effective implementation, Members should be able to
invoke the article 21.5 procedure duringthe "reasonable period of time." Requiring winning parties to wait until the end of the implementation period could
effectively delay implementation until the very end of the period and possibly
longer.
Further, the EC's opaque plan illustrates that even if available to winning
complainants during the fifteen-month period, it may be extremely difficult for
them to demonstrate that the defending countries' actions, or lack thereof, are
not "consistent" with its implementation obligations.
7. European Communities-MeasuresAffecting Meat and Meat Products
On August 18, 1997, a panel convened at the request of the United States and
Canada found that the EC's ban on imports of meat and meat products from cattle
treated with one or more of six growth-promotion hormones was inconsistent with
articles 3.1, 5.1 and 5.5 of the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures. 2 9 The EC appealed the panel decisions. On January
16, 1998, the Appellate Body issued its decisions by affirming the result, but

129. See EC Measures ConcerningMeat and Meat Products (Hormones)-Complaintby CanadaReport of the Panel, WT/DS48/R/CAN (Aug. 18, 1997), at WTO Website, supra note 33; EC
MeasuresConcerning Meat andMeat Products (Hormones)-Complaintby the United States-Report
of the Panel, WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997), at WTO Website, supra note 33.
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overturning some aspects of the panel's reasoning. 130 The DSB adopted the Appellate Body decision on February 13, 1998.
Notably, both the EC and the United States interpreted the Appellate Body's
decision as a victory. The EC claimed that the decision allows it one year to
identify appropriate evidence of the risk of hormone-treated beef. 13'Accordingly,
EC officials have stated that the ban will remain in place for the fifteen-month
period, while additional scientific studies are completed that
would enable them
32
to comply with the requirements of the SPS Agreement.1
The United States interprets the ruling to require immediate termination of
the ban, stating that "[a]nything short of a clear commitment to remove an
unjustified ban threatens our mutually shared interest in maintaining an effective
rules-based trading system."' 3 3 The U.S. position is that the SPS Agreement
does not permit the EC to have another bite at the apple to develop scientific
evidence to support its ban.
The EU proposed an implementation timetable of thirty-nine months, while
the United States and Canada insisted upon ten months. 34 Unable to agree on
the timetable, the parties submitted the matter to binding arbitration on April 8,
1998; the arbitrator, Julio Lacarte Mur6, held that the reasonable period of time
in this case was fifteen months. 35 On this occasion, the arbitrator clarified that
"the party seeking to prove that there are 'particular circumstances' justifying
36
a shorter or a longer time has the burden of proof under article 21.3(c)."
As of August 1998, the EU remained insistent that it would conduct a new
risk assessment and that it could rely on that new assessment, if appropriate, to
continue its ban.' 37 However, the EU indicated that if the new risk assessment
was not completed by the arbitrator's deadline for compliance-May 13, 1998it would re-evaluate its options for amending the ban. 38

130. See EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)-AB-1997-4-Report
of the Appellate Panel, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998), at WTO Website, supra note 33.
131. See EC Welcomes WTO Decision to Allow Ban on Hormones, CHEMICAL Bus. NEWSBASE,

Feb. 10, 1998.
132. See EU Loses Hormones Case, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1998; see WTO's Beef Rulings Give
Europeans Food For Thought, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1998. Some estimates are that the type of risk
assessment to which EU officials refer could take years to complete. See EU Hit for Politics in Food
Safety; Import Rules at Core of U.S. Complaint, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 26, 1998.
133. WTO Backs U.S. in Hormone Treated Beef, AAP NEWSFEED, Jan. 17, 1998. See also Tani
Freedman, U.S., EU Claim Victory Over Hormone-TreatedBeef Verdict, AAP NEWSFEED, Jan, 17,
1998,
134. See Julio Lacarte Mur6, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
Arbitration under article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, WT/DS26/15, WT/DS48/13 para. 26 (May 26, 1998) [hereinafter Arbitrator's
Decision EC Beef Hormones], at WTO Website, supra, note 33.
135. Id. para. 48.
136. Id. para. 27.
137. EU Conducting New Risk Assessment on Dangers of Hormone Beef, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
July 10, 1998.
138. Id.
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The issues and disagreements shaping up between the United States and Canada
and EC over implementation of the EC-BeefHormonesdecision raise even more
clearly than the EC-Bananas case three key questions. The first is the extent
to which "implementation" will be effective in more complicated cases in which
there is substantial disagreement over the proper interpretation of the panel and/
or Appellate Body decisions.
The second question is under what, ifany, circumstances a WTO Member should
be allowed to use the fifteen-month "implementation" period to develop a substitute measure, while maintaining an existing WTO-inconsistent measure. In this
regard, a key question is whether, at the end of the fifteen-month period, the ninetyday procedure provided for at article 21.5 of the DSU will be adequate for a panel
to review and assess the new measure. For example, in this case suppose that the
EC in fact develops scientific evidence that, it claims, supports its ban. Will a panel
be able to review that evidence, and the arguments presented by the parties relating
to it, in three months when, in the original case, the panel was barely able to complete its work in eight to ten months? At best, the answer is unclear.
The prospect of the EC's attempt to use the implementation period to rejustify
its hormones ban poses the issue of whether the implementation period will
become a de facto remand to the losing Member, in which, at the end of the
implementation period, the Member's action is reviewed by the original panel
for adequacy with the panel and/or Appellate Body's original decision. In our
view, this would appear to be an inevitable consequence of the way the DSU
addresses implementation. At the same time, if the article 21 process is to be
used in this manner, losing defendants should be required to: (1) explain with
particular clarity their proposed cause of action and why it is likely to result in
full implementation; and (2) justify with particular specificity the need for the
time requested to complete the effective "remand."
At the March 13, 1998 meeting of the DSB, the EU announced that it would
"fulfill its obligations under the WTO and implement" the Appellate Body ruling;
however, it stated that it would do so by carrying out a "complementary risk
assessment" while maintaining in place its prohibition on imports of hormonetreated beef. 139 In response, the United States issued a strongly-worded objection
stating that:
[r]eports from Europe that the EU intends to conduct yet another risk assessment raise
serious questions whether the EU intends in good faith to comply with its SPS Agreement
obligations. The EU approach is based on a highly distorted reading of the WTO
Appellate Body report, mistakenly relying on a single paragraph of that report, taken
completely out of context ....
For the EU now to suggest 4that it can develop contrary
scientific evidence raises serious questions of credibility.' 0
139.
Release
140.
Release

WTO Dispute Settlement Body Meeting: EU States Its Intention on Hormones, EU Press
No. 17/98, Mar. 13, 1998.
AmbassadorBarshefsky Calls for EU Compliance on WTO Hormones Decision, USTR Press
No. 98-27, Mar. 13, 1998.
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Obviously, implementation of this decision will test the ability of the implementation provisions of the DSU to handle complicated cases in which the complaining
and defending parties espouse sharply different views as to the losing party's
obligations. Use of article 21.5 and application of the guideposts suggested above
offer one way to enable the system to manage this and other similar disputes
effectively.
8. India-PatentProtectionfor Pharmaceuticaland
Agricultural Chemical Products
On September 5, 1997, a panel established at the request of the United States
found that India's failure to establish a mechanism to preserve novelty and priority
in applications for product patents for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical
inventions under its Patent Act of 1970 was inconsistent with article 70.8(a) or
article 63(1) and (2) of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 4 ' The Panel further determined that India's failure
to establish a system for granting exclusive marketing rights was inconsistent
with its obligations under article 70.9 of the TRIPS. 142 India appealed the panel
decision. On December 19, 1997, the Appellate Body affirmed the panel decision,
and the DSB formally adopted the decision on January 16, 1998.143
Even before issuance and formal adoption of the Appellate Body decision,
India began to review the potential consequences of the panel decision. In August
1997, Indian Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral established a committee to
"study" the implications of the decision, which would require India to amend
its Patent Act of 1970.'" The committee of ten members included law makers
141. See India-PatentProtectionfor Pharmaceuticaland Agricultural Chemical Products-Report of the Panel, WT/DS50/R at 66 (Sept. 5, 1997) [hereinafter WTO Panel Report India-Patents],
at WTO Website, supra note 33. Indian law currently prohibits patents for any invention intended
for use as a food, medicine, or drug, or relating to substances produced by chemical processes and
biological inventions for treatment of humans, animals, or plants. See id. at 9.
142. Under article 70.8 of TRIPS, India was required to establish accepted procedures for filing
of patent applications for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products by January 1, 1995.
Article 70.8 also required India to provide exclusive marketing rights before a patent is approved.
Under TRIPS, all developing countries have a ten-year grace period to implement intellectual property
rights (IPRs), which extend the period of patent protection and allow for patents on products as well
as processes. Under articles 70.8 and 70.9 of the agreement, however, the countries must provide
two transitional measures: (1) a "mailbox" must be created for filing patent applications; and (2)
"exclusive marketing rights" (EMRs) must be granted to any company that has filed a patent application and obtained marketing approval in another WTO-member state. See id. at 8. India's previous
Congress Party government attempted to pass legislation fulfilling the TRIPS obligations, but yielded
after intense opposition by the Communist Party of India (CPI), the Communist Party of India-Marxist
(CPI (M)), the Bharatiya Janata Party, and the centrist Janata Dal Party. See India Group Seeks to
Address WTO Panel on Patents, J. OF CoM., Dec. 2, 1996.
143. See India-PatentProtection for Pharmaceuticaland Agricultural Products-AB-1997-5,
WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report India-Patents], at WTO
Website, supra note 33.
144. See N. Vasuki Rao, India Plans Committee on Patent Law Reform, J. OF CoMm., Aug. 21,
1997. See also WTO Tells India to Amend Its Patent Laws, THE HINDU, Jan. 18, 1997.
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opposed to compliance with the WTO, but a majority favored quick amendment
to the Patent Act. As a result, several panelists resigned from the panel, arguing
that the committee was biased toward compliance with the WTO and that opposition parties were not adequately represented. The panel did not issue any recommendations. 45
'
Despite strong opposition from certain quarters, and while the case remained
pending in the Appellate Body, India sought to identify implementation strategies
that were consistent with both the TRIPS Agreement and India's own domestic
policy objectives. For example, some politicians suggested that India could rely
upon articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS in order to interpret the "exclusive marketing46
rights" requirement of the Agreement as inconsistent with the public interest. 1
On this basis, safeguards could be written into
Indian law to insure that medicines
47
and other innovations benefit the public. 1
In December 1997, India's government collapsed. On February 13, 1998, a
caretaker government, also headed by Prime Minister Gujral, announced that it
would need until at least mid-June 1999, to implement the WTO decision. 48 The
United States rejected this proposal at a meeting of the DSB on February 13,
1998.149 Elections held in early March enabled the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) to form a government on March 19, 1998."5° The BJP has
pledged to resist pressure from the WTO, but some Indian trade experts expect
that the government will implement minimum requirements, in part because
Indian pharmaceutical and chemical firms have pressured the government to enact
reforms.'' At a meeting of the DSB on March 13, 1998, India announced its
intention to comply with the ruling.' 52 If India does not provide an acceptable
plan and timetable, the United States has announced that it will submit the matter

145. See A Ruling for BiD-piracy, THE HINDU, Feb. 8, 1998. See also Praful Bidwai, Rift in
India Over Patents May Affect Other Countries, INTER PRESS SERV., Oct. 16, 1997; Government
and Politics: The Patents Pitfall, Bus. INDIA, Oct. 20, 1997.
146. See Bidwai, supra note 145; see also Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, MarrakeshAgreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol 31; (1994), 33 I.L.M.
81 (1994) arts. 70.8, 70.9 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
147. See id. Article 7 of TRIPS states that intellectual property rights "[sihould contribute to the
promotion of technological innovation ...

to the mutual advantage of producers and users ...

in

a manner conducive to social and economic welfare .... " Article 8 states that Members may adopt
"[m]easures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in
sectors of vital importance to . . . socio-economic ... development ....
Id.
148. See EU Loses Hormones Case, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 14, 1998.
149. See id.
150. See Kenneth J. Cooper, India's Hindu Nationalists Take Charge, THE WASH. POST, Mar.
20, 1998.
151. See Miriam Jordan, Will India Finally Yield to Patent Protection?, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Mar. 21, 1998.
152. Timothy Reif, Telephone Interview with Dan Brinza, Legal Advisor, USTR Delegation to
the WTO, Geneva, Switzerland (Mar. 26, 1998).
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to binding arbitration.'53 India has three weeks from March 20, 1998 to announce
its plan.' 54
IV. Initial Conclusions
At the outset, we offer a note of caution with respect to our analysis of the
operation to date of the panel implementation process under articles 21 and 22
of the DSU. As the fourth and final stage of the dispute resolution process under
the DSU, the implementation stage has begun in only eight cases, and in only
two of those has the "reasonable period of time" run its full course. By contrast,
to date there have been 117 requests for consultations (on eighty-two distinct
55
matters), eleven final panel decisions, and nine Appellate Body decisions.
Accordingly, in the case of implementation, the empirical basis for conclusions
is particularly thin.
Nonetheless, the operation to date of the implementation process does provide
a basis for some initial comments and conclusions beyond those reflected in the
case discussions above. First, it is clear that there are two key issues related to
the efficacy of implementation: speed and completeness. Based on the cases to
date, the first factor-speed-is likely to be far the easier of the two issues to
resolve. That is because parties in three cases have already invoked the article
21.3(c) binding arbitration process to address the question of whether fifteen
months or some other period of time for implementation is a "reasonable period"
within the meaning of article 21.3. The issue was resolved either by the arbitrator's
decision or by the parties in bilateral negotiations relying on the arbitrator's
decision.
In short, the speed of implementation appears likely to be easier to resolve in
part because it is an issue that lends itself to compromise. The more difficult
questions about timeframe are whether the timeframes are too long to be of
practical use either to governments or to the businesses whose commercial activities are being adversely affected. In that regard, our preliminary conclusion is that,
even though faster implementation scenarios would be attractive to complainant
governments and their commercial interests, for the most part the implementation
schedules followed appear to be reasonable.
The most complicated question concerns whether implementation will be
effective in terms of the completeness of the losing party's actions, from the
point of the view of the winning party or parties. This issue is arising in cases
such as EC-BeefHormones in which, due to the relatively greater complexity
of the legal or factual issues in the case, or the types of measures involved,
there is more room for a losing party to "interpret" the rulings or recommenda153. Id.
154. Id.
155. The figure for Appellate Body decisions includes the Canadian and U.S. Beef Hormones
cases as one case.
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tions of a panel decision in ways that favor the continuation-in some form
or to some extent-of the offending measures or the effective protection they
provided.
In addition, important ancillary issues have already arisen such as whether a
losing party can use the fifteen-month period to develop substitute measures of
protection. These substitutes might be either direct replicas of the measure found
to be WTO-inconsistent-for example, the EC's assertion that it will now develop
adequate scientific evidence to support its ban on hormone-treated beef-or alternative means of accomplishing the same objective-for example, suggestions in
some recent press reports that India may attempt to avoid providing patent protection under articles 63 and 70 of the TRIPS by enacting measures ostensibly
justified by articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS.
These issues present more difficult challenges for the system. They are, in
our view, likely to arise in all but the most straightforward cases. And, even in
relatively simple cases, there can be extensive negotiations over appropriate steps
to be taken for implementation. Such negotiation occurred, for example, in the
aftermath to the Japan-Liquordecision. In that case, which involved relatively
clear issues of equalizing rates of taxation of different products, there were extensive negotiations between Japan and the three complainants in that case, particularly the United States. However, to the credit of the system, the negotiations
concerned how Japan would pay for a more lengthy period of implementation
for some products with concessions on others. The end-result of what Japan had
to do was never seriously in question.
By contrast, as the EC-Bananas and EC-Beef Hormones cases illustrate,
somewhat more complicated cases are likely to pose more difficult implementation
issues. In these cases, in which the implementation process is still in a relatively
early stage, it is already apparent that there are substantial disagreements among
the parties as to what implementation steps are called for.
In these cases, there are basically two options for how the process can develop.
In the first option, the only tool that winning complainants can use will be to
seek binding arbitration over the "reasonable period of time." ' 5 6 Beyond the
limited guidance that can come out of binding arbitration, the parties will, throughout the fifteen-month or so implementation period, exchange charges and countercharges and draw lines in the sand based on their respective interpretations of
the panel or Appellate Body decision, after which the complainant will in all
likelihood invoke articles 22.2 and 22.6 to request authorization to retaliate on
the grounds that the losing defendant has not implemented the report.

156. In article XXIII:I(b) "non-violation" nullification or impairment cases, article 26.1 of the
DSU provides that the binding arbitration process may also include, at the request of either party,
"a determination of the level of benefits which have been nullified or impaired, and may also suggest
ways and means of reaching a mutually satisfactory adjustment." However, these elements are clearly
restricted to non-violation context.
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The result under Option 1 is not optimal. The situation would have escalated
to near-confrontation and fifteen months would have passed with little or no
satisfactory action having been taken. At that point, one or the other party could
invoke article 21.5 to revive the original panel to resolve the disagreement;
however, the circumstances for an article 21.5 process at such a late stage are
far from optimal. The original panelists may be unavailable to reinterpret their
complex decision based on a complex record of factual and legal issues. Moreover,
if the panel then advises the losing party to take steps that it had resisted taking,
the panel will either have to direct it to do so immediately or the winning complainants will have to wait a further period of time, claiming that their article 22.6
rights to seek retaliation have been impaired.
This process is not dissimilar to what the United States faced in the wake of
its 1990 victory against the EC on subsidies to oilseeds. 5 7 The United States
reconvened the panel a year later to review the EC's non-implementation and the
panel provided more specific direction to the EC to bring itself into conformity. 158
The alternative is for winning complainants to put the article 21.5 process to
work early-for example, starting three to six months after adoption of the panel
or Appellate Body decision-to monitor the losing country's implementation. If
article 21.5 is used early and effectively, it can serve as a discipline on the
temptation for losing defendants to attempt to string out implementation for as
long a period of time as possible, to obfuscate, and to preserve maximum latitude.

157. See GATT Dispute Panel Report on European Economic Community-Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, Jan. 25, 1990,
GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 86 (1991); GATT Dispute Panel Follow-Up Report on European
Economic Community-Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and
Related Animal-Feed Proteins, Mar. 31, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 9 (1993).
158. See id.
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